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I. INTRODUCTION 
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations 
of civil marriage, a person who enters into an intimate, 
exclusive union with another of the same sex is arbitrarily 
deprived of membership in one of our community’s most 
rewarding and cherished institutions.  That exclusion is 
incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect 
for individual autonomy and equality under law.1 
 
During March and April 2001, seven same-sex couples in 
Massachusetts attempted to obtain marriage licenses from their city 
or town clerk’s office.2  Each couple, as required by Massachusetts 
law, completed notices of intention to marry and presented these 
forms, along with the required health forms and marriage license 
fees, to a town or city clerk.3  In each instance, the clerk either 
refused to accept the notice of intention to marry or outright 
denied the license based on Massachusetts’ law that failed to 
recognize same-sex marriage.4  Instead of acquiescing in the denial 
of their marriage rights, the couples took legal action. 
On April 11, 2001, fourteen individuals, including named 
 
 1. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 949–50. 
 4. Id. at 950. 
2
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Plaintiffs Hillary and Julie Goodridge, filed suit in Superior Court 
against the Department of Public Health, stating that the 
department’s denial of their right to marry violated state laws.5  Of 
the seven couples, four had families with at least one child at the 
time they filed the lawsuit.6 
The complaint alleged various circumstances in which the 
absence of civil marriage has harmed the couples.7  For instance, 
when Julie Goodridge gave birth to the couple’s daughter, her 
partner Hillary had difficulty gaining access to both Julie and their 
infant.8  The complaint also listed (a) the inability to obtain partner 
insurance benefits and (b) limited options in providing for partner 
beneficiaries in pension plans, both as harms suffered from denial 
of the couples’ marriage rights.9 
The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that 
exclusion from marriage rights violated Massachusetts law.10  The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate 
review, and in its November 18, 2003 decision, held that 
Massachusetts may not “deny the protections, benefits, and 
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the 
same sex who wish to marry.”11  After a 180-day stay of entry of 
judgment, same-sex marriage became legal in Massachusetts on 
May 17, 2004.12  This landmark day in achieving equality for gay 
and lesbian citizens prompted a debate over what many believe to 
 
 5. Id. at 949. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 950 n.6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., id. 
 10. Id. at 951.  Plaintiffs alleged violation of the laws of the Commonwealth, 
including rights guaranteed under articles 1, 6, 7, 10, 12, and 16, and Part II, c. 1, 
§1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution.  Id. at 950.  Two provisions which 
seem particularly applicable to the plaintiffs’ claim are outlined in Article 1 and 
Article 10.  Article 1 states, “[a]ll people are born free and equal and have certain 
natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right 
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . that of seeking and 
obtaining their safety and happiness.”  MASS. CONST. art. I, amended by MASS. 
CONST. amend. CVI.  Article 1 further states, “[e]quality under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.”  Id.  
Article 10 states, “[e]ach individual of the society has a right to be protected by it 
in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws.”  
MASS. CONST. art. X. 
 11. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. 
 12. Fran Fifis & Rose Arce, Same-sex Couples Exchange Vows in Massachusetts, 
CNN.COM (May 17, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/ 
mass.samesex.marriage/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). 
3
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be the last great civil rights battle in United States history.13 
As newspapers and television stations broadcasted stories of 
gay and lesbian weddings in Massachusetts, another movement was 
taking place across the nation.  In an effort to prevent similar court 
rulings, over thirty-five states introduced legislation defining 
marriage as a union between a man and a woman.14  Of these states, 
thirty-one proposed amendments to their state constitutions 
banning marriage or its legal equivalent between same-sex 
couples.15  Minnesota is one of these states. 
On March 4, 2004, a bill for an act proposing an amendment 
to the Minnesota Constitution defining marriage as between one 
man and one woman was read for the first time in the state House 
of Representatives.16  On March 24, 2004, the bill passed in the 
House by a vote of 88 to 42.17  On March 25, 2004, the Minnesota 
Senate received the bill from the House of Representatives.18  The 
Senate, however, adjourned on May 14, 2004 without voting on the 
 
 13. See Alan Maass, Who’s Standing in the Way of Gay Marriage?  SOCIALIST 
WORKER ONLINE (Mar. 19, 2004), at http://www.socialistworker.org/2004-
1/491/49105BackofBus.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). 
 14. Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, STATELINE.ORG 
(Oct. 6, 2004, updated Nov. 3, 2004), at http://www.stateline.org/live/ 
ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=15576 (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2005). 
 15. Id.  Eleven states voted to adopt anti-same-sex marriage amendments into 
their state constitutions in the November, 2004 general election.  Mississippi, 
Montana and Oregon specified only the definition of marriage, limiting it to 
unions of one man and one woman.  Id.  The amendments in Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah go one step 
further by prohibiting civil unions and other partnership benefits.  Id.  Currently, 
eighteen states have adopted anti-same-sex marriage amendments.  Michael Foust, 
Marriage Amendment Passes Easily in Kansas, 70–30 Percent; Pro-Amendment Church 
Survives Pre-Election Arson Attempt, P.B. NEWS (Apr. 6, 2005), at 
http://www.baptistpress.org/bpnews.asp?ID=20530 (last visited Apr. 9, 2005). 
 16. Journal of the House, 83d Leg., 4900 (Minn. Mar. 4, 2004) available at 
http://ww3.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2003-04/J0304070.htm#4900 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005).  The 2004 version of the proposed amendment would 
have added a section to Article XIII of Minnesota’s Constitution, reading in part, 
“[o]nly the union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a 
marriage in Minnesota.  Any other relationship shall not be recognized as a 
marriage or its legal equivalent.”  H.F. 2798, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2004). 
 17. Journal of the House, 83d Leg., 5635 (Minn. Mar. 24, 2004) available at 
http://ww3.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2003-04/J0324078.htm#5656 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005). 
 18. Journal of the Senate, 83d Leg., 4900 (Minn. Mar.25, 2004) available at 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/journals/2003-2004/32504079.pdf#Page95 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005). 
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matter.19 
On January 6, 2005, just two days after the start of the 84th 
Legislative Session, the marriage amendment bill was once again 
introduced in the Minnesota House of Representatives.20  The 
House  passed the bill on March 31, 2005. 21  The Minnesota Senate 
received the bill on April 4 and referred it to the Judiciary 
Committee. 22  On April 7, 2005 a motion to place the bill on 
General Orders was made but did not prevail. 23  Currently, the bill 
is in the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee.24  Minnesotans 
appear divided on the issue.  In a February 2004 poll by Minnesota 
Public Radio and the St. Paul Pioneer Press, forty-nine percent of 
respondents opposed a state constitutional amendment defining 
marriage as between one man and one woman, while forty-three 
percent favored such an amendment.25 
This note examines the constitutionality of Minnesota’s 
proposed marriage amendment.  The note begins with a 
description of the recent national events leading up to the 
amendment’s proposal, followed by a discussion of the history of 
marriage in Minnesota, including passage of the Defense of 
Marriage Act in May 1997.26  Next, the note examines the language 
of Minnesota’s proposed marriage amendment and briefly 
addresses the process of amending state constitutional provisions.27  
It then analyzes the proposed amendment’s constitutionality under 
 
 19. See supra note 14. 
 20. H.F. 0006, S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) at 
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php
?b=House&f=HF006&ssn=0&y=2005 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Tom Scheck, Poll: Most Minnesotans Opposed to Gay Marriage, MINNESOTA 
PUBLIC RADIO, (Feb. 5, 2004), at http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/ 
2004/02/05_scheckt_gaymarriagepoll/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).  The poll 
included 625 voters, with a margin for error of plus or minus four percentage 
points.  Id. 
 26. See infra Part II; Patricia Lopez Baden, Gay Marriage Ban Passes Easily 
Despite Spear’s Plea, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 17, 1997, at 1B.  Although 
arguments exist which call into question the constitutionality of state defense of 
marriage laws, this article discusses the constitutionality of the United States 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as the grounds for DOMA’s unconstitutionality 
also pertain to state defense of marriage laws and to the article’s overall objective 
in concluding that Minnesota’s proposed marriage amendment is 
unconstitutional.  See infra Parts IV.D–E. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.28  
Finally, the note discusses Congress’s proposal of a Marriage 
Protection Act and the implications this would have on federal 
courts’ ability to review same-sex marriage controversies.29 
 
II. A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE INEQUALITY: PROTECTING THE STATUS 
QUO 
 
A. Preserving Racial Integrity 
 
The history of marriage is replete with discrimination.  As of 
1949, thirty states maintained legislation outlawing interracial 
marriages.30  The purpose of anti-miscegenation laws was, 
according to one court, “to preserve the racial integrity of its 
citizens,” so as not to create “a mongrel breed of citizens.”31  
Another court opined: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay 
and red, and he placed them on separate continents.  And 
but for the interference with his arrangement there would 
be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that he 
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the 
races to mix.32 
It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court 
declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.33  Despite 
Loving v. Virginia, many of these laws remained written into state 
provisions until quite recently.  It was not until 2000 that the last 
remaining state, Alabama, repealed its constitutional ban on 
 
 28. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
 29. See infra Part VII. 
 30. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44, 62 (Haw. 1993).  Minnesota was not one of the thirty states to enact legislation 
prohibiting interracial marriage.  See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5. 
 31. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955).  Miscegenation is defined as 
“[a] marriage between persons of different races.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 811 
(7th ed. 2000). 
 32. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the trial judge).  This lower court’s holding 
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 12. 
 33. Id.  The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals, which upheld Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law based on its 
1955 ruling in Naim.  Id. at 7.  See also supra text accompanying note 28. 
6
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interracial marriages.34 
B. The Scope of Loving: Minnesota Addresses the Issue of Same-Sex 
Marriage Rights 
In 1971, Minnesota rejected an application of Loving that 
would compel same-sex marriage rights.35  The appellants in Baker 
v. Nelson, Richard Baker and James McConnell, argued that state 
statutes authorized same-sex marriage, and that additionally, the 
United States Constitution required state authorization.36  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the first contention by citing 
statutory language indicating that the drafters intended marriage 
to be between persons of the opposite sex, and by referencing non-
legal and legal definitions of marriage.37 
The court further concluded that the state’s authorization of 
only certain classes to marry does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “[t]here is no 
irrational or invidious discrimination . . . . [T]here is a clear 
distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race 
and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”38  The 
court failed to outline, however, what this “clear distinction” was.  
While the court recognized that marriage is a “fundamental 
freedom,” and found denial of marriage based on racial 
classification “directly subversive of the principle of equality” and 
“sure[] to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due 
process of law,” it never explained how or why denying same-sex 
marriage does not deprive gay and lesbian citizens of liberty and 
equality.39  For reasons explained throughout the remainder of this 
note, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker should no 
longer be viewed as correct, if it ever was. 
 
 34. See ALA. CONST. amend. 667 (2000) (repealing amendment 102 which 
stated that “the legislature shall never pass any law to authorize or legalize any 
marriage between any white person and a negro, or descendant of a negro.”). 
 35. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 314–15, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971). 
 36. Id. at 310, 191 N.W.2d at 185. 
 37. Id. at 311–12, 191 N.W.2d at 185–86.  The court quoted Webster’s 
International Dictionary, which defines marriage as “the state of being united to a 
person of the opposite sex as husband or wife,” and Black’s Law Dictionary, which 
reads in part that  “[m]arriage . . . is the civil status, condition, or relation of one 
man and one woman united in law for life . . .” Id. at 186 n.1. 
 38. Id. at 313–15, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
 39. Id. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
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C. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 
Since Baker, other state courts, including Hawaii and Vermont, 
have done much to afford same-sex couples the right to marriage 
or its equivalent.40  In response to the Hawaii court decision, 
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which 
became law on September 21, 1996.41  Likewise, the Hawaii 
legislature took measures to prevent same-sex marriages before the 
court’s ruling took effect.42  In Vermont, however, the legislature 
upheld a decision of that state’s highest court by legalizing same-
sex civil unions.43 
 
 40. See Baehr v. Lewin,  852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii law 
restricting marriage to a male and a female denies same-sex couples access to 
marital status and its rights and benefits, thus “implicating the equal protection 
clause of [the Hawaii Constitution].”).  Interestingly, the Hawaii court also held 
that there is no fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage.  Id. at 57.  
Yet, the court went on to cite the Hawaii Constitution that, “[n]o person shall . . . 
be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the 
person’s civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of 
race, religion, sex, or ancestry.”  Id. at 60.  The court referenced the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition of “civil rights” as synonymous with “civil liberties.”  Id. 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990)).  Because civil liberties are 
“[p]ersonal, natural rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution,” the 
court held that these could not be taken away on the bases of race, religion, sex or 
ancestry without also violating the right to equal protection of Hawaii’s laws.  Id.; 
see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that same-sex couples 
are entitled under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution to 
the benefits and protections available to opposite-sex couples).  The Common 
Benefits Clause reads in part, “government is, or ought to be, instituted for the 
common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation or community; 
and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family or 
set of men, who are a part only of that community . . . .” VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VI, 
amended by VT. CONST. ch. II, § 76).  The amendment did not alter the meaning of 
the constitutional provision, but substituted “person” and “persons” for “man” and 
“men.”  Id.  The court left it to the legislature to establish an appropriate means 
for fulfilling this constitutional mandate.  Baker, 744 A.2d at 886. 
 41. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).  DOMA enables states to 
disregard same-sex marriages validly performed in other states, and defines 
marriage as between one man and one woman.  Id. 
 42. See Evan Wolfson, Silver Lining in Disappointing End for Hawaii Case, 
LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 1, 2000), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/documents/record?record=597 (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).  A 1998 
amendment to the Hawaii Constitution removed the same-sex marriage issue from 
the ambit of Hawaii’s equal protection clause, thereby ending any chance that 
Baehr might legalize same-sex marriages in Hawaii.  Id. 
 43. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201, 1202 (2004).  Civil unions entitle 
partners of the same-sex to “receive the benefits and protections” afforded to 
spouses, and also require that same-sex couples “be subject to the responsibilities 
of spouses.”  Id. 
8
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Many states, including Minnesota, have passed legislation 
echoing DOMA, defining marriage as between one man and one 
woman, prohibiting same-sex marriage and recognition of same-sex 
marriages performed in other states or foreign jurisdictions.44  In 
light of the recent Massachusetts decision in Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health legalizing same-sex marriage,45 Minnesota has taken 
action in an attempt to prevent its supreme court from similarly 
ruling that Minnesota’s anti-same-sex marriage laws are 
unconstitutional.  The result of this action has culminated in a 
proposal to amend the Minnesota State Constitution. 
 
III. MINNESOTA’S PROPOSED MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
 
A. The Language of the Amendment 
 
The proposed marriage amendment has two sections.  The 
first section, entitled “Constitutional Amendment Proposed,” states, 
[a]n amendment to the Minnesota Constitution is 
proposed to the people.  If the amendment is adopted, a 
section shall be added to article XIII, to read: Sec. 13.  
Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or 
recognized as a marriage in Minnesota.  Any other 
relationship shall not be recognized as a marriage or its 
legal equivalent by the state or any of its political 
subdivisions.46 
Section 2 outlines the question to be submitted to voters, 
which reads, “Shall the Minnesota Constitution be amended to 
provide that the state and its political subdivisions shall recognize 
marriage or its legal equivalent as limited to only the union of one 
man and one woman?”47 
 
 44. MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2004).  Minnesota 
Statutes section 517.01 reads in part, “[m]arriage, so far as its validity in law is 
concerned, is a civil contract between a man and a woman . . . .  Lawful marriage 
may be contracted only between persons of the opposite sex . . . .”  MINN. STAT. § 
517.01.  Section 517.03 was amended to prohibit “a marriage between persons of 
the same sex,” and states, “[a] marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, 
either under common law or statute, that is recognized by another state or foreign 
jurisdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by virtue of the 
marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this state.”  MINN. STAT. § 517.03 
(1997). 
 45. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 46. H.F. 006, S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). 
 47. Id.  The amendment in its 2004 form proposed submission to the people 
of Minnesota in the 2004 general election.  H.F. 2798, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 
9
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B. The Amendment Process 
 
1. Passing the Amendment 
 
The Minnesota Constitution may be amended in one of two 
ways.  First, a majority of persons elected to each house of the 
legislature may propose a constitutional amendment.  Once a 
proposed amendment has passed through both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, it is submitted to state electors at a 
general election for their approval or rejection.48  Amendments will 
only be added to the Constitution if a majority of electors votes to 
ratify the amendment.49 
The Minnesota Constitution may also be amended through a 
Constitutional Convention.  This process requires that two-thirds of 
persons elected to each house of the legislature approve 
submission to electors at a general election the question of whether 
to call a convention to revise the Constitution.50  If a majority of 
electors vote for a convention, the legislature will call a convention 
at its next session.51  Once the convention has revised the proposal, 
the revision is submitted to the people at the next general 
election.52  Three-fifths of voters on the issue must ratify the 
revision to adopt the language as a new Minnesota Constitution.53 
State supreme courts have the authority to conduct post-
amendment review to ensure that amendment procedures adhere 
to state constitutional requirements.54  Courts may not, however, 
 
2004).  The current version proposes submission to Minnesotans at the 2006 
general election.  H.F. 006, S.F. 1691,  84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005). 
 48. MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 1.  Constitutional amendments are published with 
session laws.  Id. 
 49. Id.  A majority of electors voting in the election, and not just a majority 
who vote on the amendment provision, must approve the amendment in order for 
it to be added to the Constitution.  Id. 
 50. MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
 51. Id.  Conventions must be composed of the same number of members as 
there are in the house of representatives, and must be chosen in the same manner 
as members of the house of representatives are chosen.  Id.  The delegates must 
convene within three months following their appointment to the convention.  Id. 
 52. MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 3.  The general election must be held at least 90 
days after submission of the revised Constitution.  Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Graham v. Jones, 3 So.2d 761, 767 (La. 1941) (stating, “the judicial 
department of the government invariably has the right to consider whether the 
legislative department and its agencies have observed constitutional requirements 
10
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judge the wisdom of an amendment or consider whether it 
conflicts with existing state law.55  Therefore, once adopted, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court may only invalidate an amendment if it 
finds that the amendment process in some way violated 
constitutional requirements. 
2. The Last Word: Supreme Law of the Land 
For a state constitutional provision to be enforceable, it must 
not contravene the United States Constitution.56  When 
determining whether an amendment violates the Constitution, 
every reasonable presumption must be entertained in favor of the 
amendment’s validity.57 
It is only in the most extreme circumstances that a supreme 
court will invalidate a state constitutional amendment.58  Unless a 
 
in attempting to amend the Constitution and may set aside their acts in case they 
have not done so.”); New Mexico ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing Board, 888 P.2d 
458, 460 (N.M. 1995) (concluding that a proposed state constitutional 
amendment, despite its approval by voters, was an unconstitutional violation of the 
procedural requirements for amending New Mexico’s Constitution). 
 55. Duggan v. Beermann, 544 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Neb. 1996); see also Omaha 
National Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Neb. 1986) (“‘conflict’ with existing 
articles or sections of the Constitution can afford no logical basis for invalidating 
an initiative proposal. . . . When a newly adopted amendment does conflict with 
preexisting constitutional provisions the new amendment necessarily supersedes 
the previous provision.” (quoting Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help 
Florida, 363 So.2d 337, 341–42 (Fla. 1978)).  Nor may courts interfere with the 
amendment process before the adoption of new provisions on the basis that such 
provisions are unconstitutional.  Grose v. Firestone, 422 So.2d 303, 306 (Fla. 
1982); State ex rel. Slemmer v. Brown, 295 N.E.2d 434, 435–36 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1973). 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance there of; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  Id.  See 
also Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785, 790 (Fla. 1956) (holding that states “have a right 
to change, abrogate or modify [state constitutional provisions] in any manner they 
see fit so long as they [k]eep within the confines of the Federal Constitution.”); In 
re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d 1, 15 (R.I. 1992) (stating that the 
right to amend state Constitutions is only checked by limits imposed by the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 57. See e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors of Des Moines County, 320 N.W.2d 
589, 592 (Iowa 1982); Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 449 A.2d 1144, 1146–47 
(Md. 1982); Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 250, 254 (Me. 1970); Opinion of the 
Justices, 430 A.2d 188, 190 (N.H. 1981); Southern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 497 S.W.2d 
891, 895 (Tenn. 1973). 
 58. See State ex rel. Rhodes v. Brown, 296 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ohio 1973). 
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constitutional amendment is “plainly and palpably” invalid, it 
should be upheld.59  An amendment that takes away or contradicts 
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution meets these 
criteria.60  Thus, while state constitutions may expand federal 
constitutional rights, if ever a state constitutional provision takes 
away rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution, the 
Federal Constitution will supersede state law and reign as the 
“Supreme Law of the Land.”61 
 




Even before the adoption of the United States Constitution, 
the values underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause were already 
apparent in United States history.  The Articles of Confederation, 
agreed to by Congress on November 15, 1777 and ratified by the 
states on March 1, 1781, contained a clause stating, “Full faith and 
credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts and 
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other 
state.”62  Inclusion of this provision in the Articles of Confederation, 
which upheld considerably looser relations among states, indicates 
the importance of such a provision to the endurance of a successful 
Union.63 
When the framers of the United States Constitution first 
proposed the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the 
wording of the clause differed from the wording later adopted into 
the Constitution.64  As originally proposed, the Full Faith and 
 
 59. See e.g. Barnhart v. Herseth, 222 N.W.2d 131, 136 (S.D. 1974) (quoting 
State ex rel. Adams v. Herried, 72 N.W.93, 97 (S.D. 1897)). 
 60. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (stating that state 
laws which conflict with federal law are without effect); In re Rourke v. N.Y. Dept. 
of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 1993) (asserting that while states may 
supplement federal constitutional guarantees, they may not circumscribe them); 
Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Crapitto, 907 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Tex. 1995) 
(holding that state constitutions cannot subtract from rights guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 62. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781). 
 63. ANASTAPLO, GEORGE, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 168 (1989). 
 64. See James M. Patten, The Defense of Marriage Act: How Congress Said “No” to 
Full Faith and Credit and the Constitution, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 939, 946–47 
(1998). 
12
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Credit Clause read, 
Full Faith and Credit ought to be given in each state to the 
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every 
other state; and the legislature shall, by general laws, 
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and 
proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect which 
judgments obtained in one state shall have in another.65 
However, upon proposal by James Madison, the language was 
later changed to substitute “shall” for “ought to” and “may” for 
“shall”.66  The result of this shift in language created a document 
that unambiguously demanded each state to recognize public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings performed in any other state of 
the Union.  Further, such recognition is so absolute that the 
framers deemed total control by the legislature to prescribe the 
manner in which this provision be enacted unnecessary; instead, 
the legislature is left with the ability, but not the unequivocal duty, 
to ordain the manner in which states are to grant full faith and 
credit to the acts, records, and proceedings of all other states.67 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, as adopted into the United 
States Constitution of 1787, states, 
Full faith and credit shall be given, in each state, to the 
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every 
other state. And the Congress may, by general laws, 
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and 
proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect thereof.68 
As one commentator stated in interpreting the meaning 
behind this Clause, 
[a] motive of a higher kind must naturally have directed 
[the framers] to the provision.  It must have been, “to 
form a more perfect union,” and to give to each State a 
higher security and confidence in the others, by 
attributing a superior sanctity and conclusiveness to the 
public acts and judicial proceedings of all.69 
Not only did the framers provide for faith and credit to the 
 
 65. MEIGS, WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 256 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Patten, supra note 64, at 947. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 69. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: WITH PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 190 (1994). 
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acts, records and judicial proceedings of each state, they gave them 
full faith and credit, leaving them with “positive and absolute verity, 
so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them be denied 
. . . .”70  The Full Faith and Credit Clause, as adopted, leaves no 
question but that full faith and credit be given to acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of each and every state. 
B. The Effects Clause: Limits on Congressional Power 
The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 
known as the Effects Clause.  The object of this sentence is “to 
introduce uniformity in the rules of proof,” regulating not which 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings are to be given full faith and 
credit, but the manner in which proof of these are to be presented.71  
Any other interpretation would be “wholly senseless” because it 
would give Congress the power to nullify the purpose under which 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause was adopted.72  Therefore, 
although the Effects Clause grants Congress the power to dictate 
the manner in which full faith and credit is to be afforded, the 
Constitution also limits this power by mandating absolute full faith 
and credit to the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each 
state. 
 
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
 
1. Full Faith and Credit to Public Acts, Statutes, and State 
Constitutions 
 
Courts have frequently reiterated the importance of lending 
full faith and credit to laws and rulings of sister states.73  Courts 
have also upheld the extension of full faith and credit to public acts 
within the legislative jurisdiction of an enacting state.74  Further, 
 
 70. Id. at 191. 
 71. Id. at 192. 
 72. Id. at 193. 
 73. See Newman v. Worcester Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re L.C.), 659 N.E.2d 
593, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (granting full faith and credit to a Maryland court 
ruling removing a child from custody of an Indiana family); LeBlanc v. United 
Eng’s & Constructors, Inc., 584 A.2d 675, 677–78 (Me. 1991) (stating that Maine 
could only exercise jurisdiction where awards were previously granted in another 
state if the exercise of jurisdiction did not reflect hostility toward the laws of a 
sister state or threaten the system of cooperative federalism). 
 74. See Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 30 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Ill. 1940). 
14
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the United States Supreme Court has stated that statutes are public 
acts within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.75  
Finally, courts afford state Constitutions full faith and credit 
according to the same standards that mandate full faith and credit 
of public acts, records, and judicial proceedings.76 
2. Conflict of Laws Generally 
Courts have addressed conflicts arising from policy differences 
between states’ laws.  In Hirson v. United Stores Corp., the New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated that local policy “may 
not over-ride the constitutional requirement of full faith and 
credit.”77  In contrast, federal courts have held that there is room 
for some negotiation concerning conflicting state policies in the 
effect and operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.78  This 
“room” for negotiation, however, is narrow.79  While the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause does not compel a state to substitute another 
state’s conflicting laws for its own,80 it does compel states “to 
recognize and respect rights acquired by private individuals under 
the laws of other states, though such laws may differ from its own 
and vary from its policy.”81 
3. Conflict of Laws Regarding Marriage 
The general rule regarding conflicts between states’ laws 
concerning marriage is that the law of the state in which the 
marriage is contracted or celebrated determines the validity of a 
marriage.82  However, there is one exception to this rule.  If 
 
 75. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411 (1955); John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 183 (1936); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 644; 
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1932). 
 76. See People v. Zuccaro, 108 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. 1951). 
 77. Hirson v. United Stores Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942). 
 78. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273–74 (1935); Alaska 
Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Acc. Com'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Broderick, 294 U.S. at 
642. 
 79. Broderick, 294 U.S. at 642; Hannah v. Gen. Motors Corp., 969 F. Supp. 554, 
557 (1996). 
 80. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988); Pacific Employers Ins. 
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939); Durham v. Ark. 
Dept. of Human Servs., 912 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ark. 1995). 
 81. Roller v. Murray, 76 S.E. 172, 175 (W.Va. 1912). 
 82. Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703, 704–05 (2nd Cir. 1950); Rogers 
v. Sullivan, 795 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D.N.C. 1992); In re Mortenson’s Estate, 316 
P.2d 1106, 1107 (Ariz. 1957); Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn. 
15
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recognition of a marriage performed outside a forum state is 
contrary to the public policy of the forum, such marriage may be 
deemed invalid.83  To date, marriages that were valid where 
performed have been invalidated only in violation of “a strong 
policy of the state where at least one of the spouses was domiciled 
at the time of the marriage and where both made their home 
immediately thereafter.”84 
Until now, court precedent disallows for full faith and credit to 
marriages based only on limited and specific policy concerns.  
Acceptable policy concerns historically have been limited to 
protecting individuals who are parties to the marriages and to 
upholding formalized marriage procedures.85  This limitation also 
includes non-recognition of a marriage where a previous marriage 
has not yet ended, where one of the parties is of minority age, 
where one party to the marriage was mentally incompetent, where 
the marriage was incestuous, or where the marriage union was 
established by common law.86 
 
1961); Fisher v. Toombs County Nursing Home, 479 S.E.2d 180, 182–83 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1996); Ma v. Ma, 483 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Laikola 
v. Engineered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653, 655–56 (Minn. 1979). 
 83. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500, 503–04 (3rd Cir. 1961) 
(applying the law of the party’s domicile at the time an alleged common law 
marriage took place, thereby invalidating the marriage, despite its validity in the 
state where it took place); In re Mortenson’s Estate, 316 P.2d at 1108 (holding 
invalid a marriage between first cousins who were residents of and intended to live 
within Arizona, even though the marriage was valid in the state in which it was 
contracted); Catalano, 170 A.2d at 728 (invalidating a marriage legally performed 
in Italy between a Connecticut resident and his niece); Beddow v. Beddow, 257 
S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (invalidating a marriage performed outside of 
Kentucky between Kentucky residents, one of whom had been adjudged insane 
prior to the marriage). 
 84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT : CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. j. 
(1971). 
 85. Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage 
and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 247, 267–68 (1994). 
 86. Id. at 267.  For decisions invalidating marriage when a previous marriage 
had not ended, see Parker v. Parker, 270 A.2d 94, 96 (Conn. 1970); K v. K, 393 
N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977); Bolinski v. Bolinski, 122 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 
(N.Y. City Ct. 1953).  In Wilkins v. Zelichowski, the court held that a marriage 
performed and valid in Indiana was void in New Jersey because the wife’s minority 
at the time of the marriage violated New Jersey’s public policy.  140 A.2d 65, 69 
(N.J. 1958); see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 99 N.E. 845, 848 (N.Y. 1912) 
(holding that a marriage valid in New Jersey between an adult husband and a wife 
not of legal age to consent was invalid in New York because it was repugnant to 
New York’s public policy).  Marriages performed when one party was mentally 
incompetent have also been denied full faith and credit based on policy reasons.  
16
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Court precedent does not justify denial of same-sex marriage 
rights, since denying recognition of such marriages is intended 
neither to protect same-sex individuals nor to uphold formalized 
marriage procedures.  On the contrary, denying full faith and 
credit to same-sex marriages damages same-sex couples’ rights by 
removing protections afforded to them in the forum state as soon 
as they leave the confines of that state.  Further, this denial 
undermines the importance of formalized marriage procedures, 
which courts have continually emphasized, because it fails to hold 
all United States citizens to the same societal standard in legalizing 
their relationships. 
D. Defense of Marriage Act: A Clear Violation of Full Faith and Credit 
Although the focus of this article is on Minnesota’s proposed 
constitutional amendment regarding marriage, it is worth noting 
that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)87 is also a 
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution.88  The Act grants states the latitude to deny full faith 
and credit to same-sex marriages performed under the laws of 
another state, as well as the latitude to deny recognition of any 
right or claim arising from such marriages.89 The Effects Clause of 
the United States Constitution, however, prohibits this type of 
amendment.90  In enacting DOMA, Congress overstepped its 
constitutional authority by regulating which acts deserve full faith 
and credit.  In doing so, Congress perverted the language of the 
Constitution, which grants Congress only the limited power to 
create laws to carry out the constitutional guarantee of full faith 
and credit, but not the power to regulate when or if states may 
 
See First Nat’l Bank v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 68 N.W.2d 661, 664 (N.D. 
1955) (holding that marriages between persons of unsound mind are voidable).  
Frequently, courts also rule that states need not recognize the validity of 
incestuous marriages performed legally outside the forum state.  See In re Estate of 
May, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953).  Finally, common law marriages, although valid 
in the state in which they were performed, have been invalidated by courts on the 
grounds that they violate a states’ public policy.  See Stein v. Stein, 641 S.W.2d 856, 
857–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).  But see Netecke v. State ex. rel Dept. of Transp. and 
Dev., 715 So.2d 449, 450 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (extending full faith and credit to 
common law marriages performed in other states while failing to discuss possible 
policy exceptions).  See also cases cited supra note 80. 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 88. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1. 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 90. See infra Part. IV.B (discussing the Effects Clause). 
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apply full faith and credit.  Furthermore, DOMA bypasses case 
precedent concerning a justifiable policy rationale for denying full 
faith and credit to marriage relationships.91 
E. Unconstitutionality of Minnesota’s Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment 
Although the language of Minnesota’s proposed marriage 
amendment does not explicitly proscribe recognition of marriage 
laws of other states, this effect is inevitable.92  As such, the 
amendment will violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  The Minnesota legislature has no 
power under the Effects Clause of the United States Constitution.93  
Further, although state case precedent falls short of binding the 
legislature, the legislature has disregarded court-related history 
regarding acceptable policy justifications for non-recognition of 
marriage laws of other states.94  If the legislature enacts the 
marriage amendment, Minnesota courts will likely strike down the 
amendment because no case precedent supports a justifiable policy 
reason for failing to recognizing same-sex marriage.95  Therefore, 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution, the proposed Minnesota marriage amendment is 
unconstitutional. 
 
V. FEDERAL DUE PROCESS 
 
A. Marriage Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
 
 91. See infra Parts IV.B and C.3; see also Cordell, supra note 85, at 264–71 
(elaborating on the unconstitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act). 
 92. The language, “[o]nly the union of one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as marriage,” is not limited in its scope to merely denying 
same-sex couples Minnesota marriage licenses, but will also lead to the 
invalidation and non-recognition of same-sex marriages legally performed in other 
states.  See H.F. 006, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) available at 
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=H0006.0&session=ls84 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2005). 
 93. See infra Part IV.B. 
 94. See supra Part IV.C.3. 
 95. See infra Part IV.C.3.  Based on case precedent, there are no viable policy 
arguments for non-recognition of same-sex marriages.  Non-recognition is aimed 
neither at protecting an individual who is a party to the marriage nor upholding 
formalized marriage procedures.  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
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reads in part, “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”96  A state 
constitutional amendment prohibiting a specific class of individuals 
from the right to marry is a denial of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause.97  Because such an amendment violates a federally 
protected right, the United States Constitution supersedes the 
states’ ability to deny marriage to same-sex couples.98 
B. Marriage as a Fundamental Right 
Although history abounds with instances of marriage 
discrimination, it also establishes an undisputable basis for 
classifying marriage as a fundamental right.  As far back as the late 
1800s, courts recognized the importance of the institution of 
marriage.99  In 1888, the United States Supreme Court stated that 
marriage creates “the most important relation in life”100 and “is the 
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would 
be neither civilization nor progress.”101 
The United States Supreme Court has since continued to 
regard marriage as a central part of American life.  In Meyer v. 
Nebraska, the Court asserted that the right “to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children” is “essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men,” and is a vital aspect of liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause.102  Again, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court 
defined marriage as “one of the basic civil rights of man,” 
fundamental to our very existence.103 
In Loving v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court 
eliminated racial marriage discrimination and upheld its previous 
decisions stating that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.104  In Zablocki v. Redhail, the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 97. See infra Part V.B. 
 98. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 99. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 211. 
 102. 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). 
 103. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 104. 388 U.S. at 12.  In Loving, the Supreme Court reiterated the conviction set 
forth in Skinner that marriage is a fundamental right.  388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  The 
Court held that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men . . . .  
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again stated that “the right to marry is part of the fundamental 
‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth [Amendment].”105  The 
right to marry is thus a federally pronounced, fundamental right. 
C. Marriage as a Right of Privacy 
Not only has the United States Supreme Court classified 
marriage as a fundamental right, but it has also held that the 
marriage relationship lies “within the zone of privacy” created by 
the Constitution.106  Although the text of the Constitution grants no 
right of privacy, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one 
aspect of liberty afforded constitutional protection under the Due 
Process Clause is the right of privacy.107 
The link between marriage rights, the right to privacy, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “liberty” becomes even 
more important in view of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.108  In Lawrence, the Supreme Court 
counseled “against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the 
meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its boundaries absent 
 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of 
the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to 
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.”  Id.  The court 
went on to say that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of 
choice to marry not be restricted by invidious . . . discriminations.  Under our 
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person . . . resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”  Id. 
 105. 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). Since Loving and Zablocki, federal courts have 
continued to uphold marriage as a civil right.  See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 304 (1990); Perez-Oropeza v. I.N.S., 56 
F.3d 43, 45 (9th Cir. 1995); Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 763, 739 
(9th Cir. 1986); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 1981); Bradbury v. 
Wainwright, 538 F. Supp. 377, 378 (M.D. Fla. 1982). 
 106. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).  The Court stated in part: 
[w]e deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights — older 
than our political parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that promotes 
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a 
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association 
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 
Id. at 486.  Subsequent cases have emphasized the Supreme Court’s unequivocal 
respect for the right to privacy in the marriage relationship.  See Zablocki, 434 U.S. 
at 384–86; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 107. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973). 
 108. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”109  
The Court emphasized that persons are entitled to respect for their 
private lives, and that the right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives individuals the full right to engage in private sexual 
acts without intervention of the government.110 
While Lawrence centralizes its holding on individual liberty to 
engage in private sexual conduct, the holding is important because 
marriage rights also fall within the zone of privacy impliedly 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.111  Lawrence notes that the right to privacy protects not 
only “sexual acts,” but also recognizes the importance of the 
relationship between persons engaging in sexual acts.112  Because 
Lawrence holds that the right to liberty entitles persons to respect 
for their private lives, free from state laws that violate human 
dignity, and because the Supreme Court has held that marriage is a 
fundamental right protected by the Constitution, the Due Process 
Clause should also protect marriage rights for same-sex couples. 
D. Standard of Review Concerning Fundamental Rights 
“Critical examination” of state interests is required when such 
interests interfere with a fundamental right, such as the right to 
marry.113  Rigorous scrutiny is not required for state regulations that 
do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into marital 
relationships.114  However, when state regulations interfere directly 
and substantially with the right to marry, strict scrutiny is 
required.115 
In Zablocki, the Court held that because a Wisconsin statute 
absolutely excluded a specific class of persons from marriage, the 
statute did not have a minimal impact and therefore required 
evaluation based on strict scrutiny.116  The Court concluded that 
 
 109. Id. at 567. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
 112. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  The Court stated that “[w]hen sexuality 
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.  The liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this 
choice.”  Id. 
 113. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). 
 114. Id. at 386–87. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 387–88.  The statute barred any persons from marriage who were 
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“[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is 
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely 
tailored to effectuate only those interests.”117  The Court stated that 
“even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute’s 
requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of 
choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be 
fundamental.”118  Despite legitimate and substantial state interests, 
the Supreme Court did not sustain the Wisconsin statute in Zablocki 
because the means by which the state chose to achieve those 
interests unnecessarily impinged on the right to marry.119 
The proposed marriage amendment to the Minnesota 
Constitution likewise prevents an entire class of persons from 
access to marriage rights.120  Therefore, should its constitutionality 
come into question, the amendment would properly be evaluated 
based on strict scrutiny. 
E. Proposed Marriage Amendment a Violation of Due Process 
If Minnesota’s proposed marriage amendment makes its way 
through both houses of the legislature and the people of 
Minnesota adopt it, the amendment will inevitably end up before 
the courts, which will have the power to conclude that it violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution.121  Precedent establishes not only that marriage 
is a fundamental right but also secures marriage as a “right of 
privacy” protected under the constitutional guarantee of liberty.122  
The Supreme Court also declared sexual intimacy and sexual acts 
as rights to liberty under the Due Process Clause.123  Just as the 
Court has protected rights of sexual intimacy between same-sex 
couples, it should also protect same-sex marriage as a right of 
 
behind in child-support payments or whose children were likely to become public 
charges.  Id. at 375. 
 117. Id. at 388. 
 118. Id. at 387. 
 119. Id. at 388. 
 120. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003) 
(referring to same-sex couples as “an entire, sizeable class . . . who have absolutely 
no access to civil marriage and its protection because they are forbidden from 
procuring a marriage license”). 
 121. See supra Part III.B (describing the state amendment process). 
 122. See supra Parts V.B–C. 
 123. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
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privacy protected by the constitutional guarantee of liberty under 
due process.  A strict scrutiny evaluation of the amendment 
requires its nullification.124  As the United States Supreme Court 
once stated, “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.”125  Should questions regarding the 
validity of the marriage amendment arrive before the Supreme 
Court, Minnesotans can be hopeful that the Court will extend the 
Constitutional guarantee of due process to same-sex couples by 
striking down the amendment, once again upholding the principle 
of liberty as it did in Lawrence. 
 
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
 
A. Does Equal Protection for Gender Extend to Same-Sex Marriages? 
 
The Equal Protection Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”126  This guarantee prohibits discrimination based on 
sex.127  For a valid equal protection claim, the law must in some way 
classify an individual.128  The argument that denial of same-sex 
marriage rights violates equal protection centers on the fact that a 
person who wishes to marry someone of the same sex is prohibited 
from doing so based solely on his or her gender classification.  This 
gender classification thereby leads to gender discrimination, which 
presumptively leads to a violation of equal protection. 
 
 124. Sufficiently important state interests do not support the amendment, 
although states might assert an important interest in regulating marriage laws.  See 
supra Part V.D.    Even so, case precedent justifies such regulation only if its aim is 
to protect individuals who are a party to the marriage or to uphold formalized 
marriage procedures.  See supra Part IV.C.3.  Since regulation of same-sex marriage 
rights furthers neither one of these interests, there is no precedent establishing it 
as a viable state interest.  Further, the impact of the proposed amendment would 
not affect only the state’s interest to regulate marriage, but would also affect the 
right of individuals to marry, which courts have long recognized as a fundamental 
right.  See supra Parts V.B and D. 
 125. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 127. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971); Lindsey v. Shalmy, 29 
F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that female employees have a right 
under the Equal Protection Clause to be free from gender discrimination in the 
workplace). 
 128. Phelps v. Phelps, 446 S.E.2d 17, 20 (N.C. 1994) (citing Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978)) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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B. Equal Application of a Classification 
If it is to withstand constitutional challenge under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a gender classification must be supported by an 
important governmental objective and must substantially relate to 
achievement of that objective.129  Proponents of the proposed 
marriage amendment may argue that the amendment is not a 
violation of equal protection based on gender, since the 
amendment would apply equally to men and women.  In 
countering this argument, it is important to examine the Court’s 
ruling in Loving v. Virginia.130  In Loving, the plaintiffs challenged a 
Virginia law that, in part, automatically voided any marriages 
between Caucasian and African American persons without any 
judicial proceedings.131  The state argued that since the law applied 
equally to both races, the statute, despite its reliance on racial 
classifications, did “not constitute an invidious discrimination based 
upon race.”132 
The state’s position in Loving closely parallels the potential 
argument for the marriage amendment.  The Court in Loving, 
however, rejected the State’s reasoning and held that mere equal 
application of a statute containing racial classifications did not 
remove the classifications from protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.133  In light of the Supreme Court’s holding, mere 
equal application of denial of marriage rights based on gender 
classifications is not enough to remove such classifications from 
constitutional protection. 
However, there is one major difference between the racial 
discrimination in Loving and the gender discrimination arising 
from the marriage amendment.  In Loving, the purpose of the laws 
prohibiting interracial marriages was to preserve the integrity of 
the white race, as opposed to preserving the integrity of the races in 
general.134  The proposed marriage amendment may not create a 
similar imbalance between men and women.  Despite this 
 
 129. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 130. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 131. Id. at 5. 
 132. Id. at 8. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 11 & n.11.  The Court does not address this contention, concluding 
that such discussion is unnecessary because the classifications themselves are 
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 11 n.11. 
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difference, if one focuses on the Court’s holding that equal 
application does not remove a racial classification from 
constitutional protection, there remains a vital parallel to gender 
classifications in the marriage amendment situation. 
C. Equal Protection as Applied to Same-Sex Marriage 
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the 
state statute limiting marriage to a man and a woman would be 
deemed unconstitutional unless the defendant was able to prove 
that the statute met strict scrutiny requirements.135  Prior to 
remanding the case, the Hawaii Supreme Court referenced Loving, 
stating that if the word “sex” were substituted for the word “race,” 
and “Article I, Section 5” for “the Fourteenth Amendment,” it 
would yield “the precise case before us together with the 
conclusion that we have reached.”136  On remand, the circuit court 
concluded that the sex-based classification in the state’s marriage 
statute is an unconstitutional violation of the state’s equal 
protection clause.137 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not name specific 
suspect classifications, courts have consistently held that sex is a 
quasi-suspect class protected under the amendment.138  This fact, 
coupled with Baehr’s extension of Loving to same-sex marriage 
rights, lends strong support to the argument that denial of same-
sex marriage rights violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  Minnesota’s proposed marriage 
amendment, which both on its face and through its application 
would deny recognition of same-sex marriages, is a violation of the 
 
 135. 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). 
 136. Id. at 68.  The result of these substitutions would read, “[W]e reject the 
notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing [sex] classifications 
is enough to remove the classifications from [Article I, Section 5’s] proscription of 
all invidious [sex] discriminations . . . .  In the case at bar . . . we deal with statutes 
containing [sex] classifications, and the fact of equal application does not 
immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which [Article I, 
Section 5] has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to [sex].”  
Loving, 388 U.S. at 8–9. 
 137. Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).   Article I of the Hawaii 
Constitution states in part, “[n]o person shall . . . be denied the equal protection 
of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person’s civil rights or be 
discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or 
ancestry.”  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 138. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. 
 
VII.  FURTHER COMPLICATIONS: THE MARRIAGE PROTECTION ACT 
 
A. Does Congress Have the Authority to Strip all Federal Courts of 
Jurisdiction to Hear Cases? 
 
On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives passed a bill 
entitled the Marriage Protection Act (MPA).139  Proponents of this 
bill intend that, by denying federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
constitutional challenges to both DOMA and the MPA, the bill will 
prevent federal courts from requiring states to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed in other states.140  Currently, the 2005 version 
of the MPA is in the U.S. House of Representatives and has been 
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.141 
Article III of the United States Constitution states that, “[t]he 
Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their authority”142 and that 
the “supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to 
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as 
the Congress shall make.”143  In Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme 
Court held that under Article III, Congress has the authority to 
stipulate exceptions to and regulations of its appellate 
jurisdiction.144  Proponents of the MPA would argue that based on 
Ex parte McCardle, Congress has the authority to deny federal 
 
 139. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 140. See Vikram David Amar, The Marriage Protection Act Bill Passed by the House of 
Representatives: Trying to Make Sense of the Nonsensical, FINDLAW’S LEGAL COMMENTARY 
(Aug. 6, 2004), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20040806.html.  The bill 
states, “[n]o court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question 
pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, 
section 1738C of this section.”  H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).  The 2005 version 
of the MPA is identical to the 2004 version.  H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 141. Bill Summary for the 109th Congress, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR01100:@@@X. 
 142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 143. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 144. 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868).  In this case, Congress did not completely limit 
federal courts’ appellate power to hear cases of habeas corpus.  Rather, Congress’s 
adoption of the Act of 1868 limited only appeals from circuit courts.  The Act did 
not exclude federal jurisdiction over habeas cases in courts other than circuit court 
appeals.  74 U.S. at 514–15. 
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jurisdiction of cases under DOMA and the MPA.  However, one 
problem with this contention is that the MPA would strip all federal 
courts of all jurisdiction to hear such cases. 
In his article, law professor and legal scholar Vikram David 
Amar asserts that 
[b]ecause Article III says federal jurisdiction “shall” 
extend to “all” such cases, it strongly implies – and many 
scholars have concluded – that there must be some 
federal court open to hear any case arising under a 
federal law, which would include MPA and DOMA cases.  
That means that, even if Congress has broad powers to 
strip the jurisdiction of lower federal courts or the 
Supreme Court, it cannot do both at once.145 
Thus, one rebuttal to the validity of the MPA is that it violates 
Article III by removing all federal jurisdiction over DOMA and 
MPA cases.146 
B. Impact if MPA is Deemed Constitutional 
Even if courts determine that the MPA is constitutional, it is 
not likely to prevent federal courts from ruling on same-sex 
marriage issues.  Same-sex couples who would seek federal 
jurisdiction over a case concerning their marriage rights could still 
allege violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clause, and of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
Article IV.147  Federal courts would thus have jurisdiction to hear 
such cases, since they do not involve review of either DOMA or the 
MPA.  Ironically, it is the opponents of same-sex marriage, and not 
same-sex couples, who would attempt to invoke interpretation of 
DOMA to bolster their argument that states need not recognize 
 
 145. Amar, supra note 140. 
 146. Another legal commentator has questioned the validity of the Marriage 
Protection Act based on constitutional separation of powers principles.  See Joanna 
Grossman, The Proposed Marriage Protection Act: Why it May be Unconstitutional, 
FINDLAW’S LEGAL COMMENTARY (July 27, 2004), available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040727.html.  “[J]urisdiction-stripping 
takes power from the Courts, and leaves it with Congress” or with state legislatures.  
Id. This creates an imbalance between the legislative and judicial branches, 
because it enables the controlling party in Congress to pass laws stripping courts of 
the right to review certain laws whenever Congress does not approve of how courts 
are handling those issues.  Id.  The ability of Congress to so act may undermine 
the general constitutional allocation of power among the branches of government.  
See id. 
 147. See supra Parts IV.C–E, V.E. 
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same-sex marriages performed in other states.148  Federal courts 
would not have jurisdiction to hear defenses based on DOMA, but 
would still be able to review federal constitutional challenges to 
state marriage amendments. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
Nearly one year has passed since the first legal same-sex 
marriage license was granted.  As Julie Goodridge herself 
commented, the sun still rose on May 18th, 2004, Massachusetts did 
not erupt into flames, and no heterosexual couples fell apart simply 
because same-sex couples got married.149  Instead, because of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling, some people are now just “a 
little more equal.”150  The Minnesota Marriage Amendment has 
risen for the second time in the legislature.  If it succeeds in the 
Senate, and if Minnesotans adopt it into their Constitution, we 
must look to the judiciary to uphold the values of the United States 
Constitution in striking down the amendment. 
As Baehr states, sometimes constitutional law mandates, against 
the will of the majority, “that customs change with an evolving 
social order.”151  The proposed marriage amendment violates the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution.152  Strong arguments exist that it also 
violates the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.153  
Even if Congress passes the Marriage Protection Act, it is likely that 
federal courts will be able to exercise jurisdiction to address the 
constitutional issues raised by state marriage amendments.154  In 
conclusion, if federal courts truly uphold the “constitutional 
principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality under 
law,”155 then they must invalidate state amendments barring same-




 148. Amar, supra note 140. 
 149. Julie Goodridge, Keynote Address at the Minneapolis National Coming-
Out Day Luncheon (October 15, 2004). 
 150. Id. 
 151. 852 P.2d at 63. 
 152. See supra Parts VI , V. 
 153. See supra Part VI. 
 154. See supra Part VII.B 
 155. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003). 
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